_______________

and its individual partners
and/or shareholders; John C.
Calhoun, R.A. Ferguson,
Unknown Attorneys and their
partners, shareholders, and
members(1-20), and Unknown
Club Member Coconspirators,
Aiders and Abettors (21-25),
Other Unknown Coconspirators,
Aiders and Abettors (25-60),  

 Defendants  

COMPLAINT  

Aforesaid Plaintiff class, by counsel, complains
against aforesaid Defendants as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 is
founded under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§1961 et seq., invoking 18
U.S.C. §2 (aiders, abettors, etc. are Principals);
(a) the provisions of section 1951 (Hobbs
Act-interference with commerce through


extortion under color of right, infra p. 30);
(b) section 1952 (Travel Act-interstate
travel, p. 34);
(c) section 1956 (money laundering, p. 38);
section 1957 (monetary transactions, p. 38);
(d) section 1341 (mail fraud, p. 42); section
1343 (wire fraud, p. 42); and

2. Jurisdiction over the pendent state claims for fraud,
suppression and deceit under §§6-5-101, 102, and 104,
Code of Alabama, 1975, (infra, ¶ 93) is founded under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
3. Venue is founded under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
4. Plaintiffs assert a private right of action against
Defendants under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (b),
(c), and (d) (infra, ¶ 107 et seq.).
5. All parties defendant are subject to the personal
jurisdiction of this court under Fed R Civ P Rule
4(e) under the nationwide service of process
provisions of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1965. The Northern
District of Alabama is the most convenient venue. The
conduct injuring Plaintiffs and continuing to injure
others occurred in Jefferson County. The individual

defendants reside in Jefferson County, Alabama or
resided there during the relevant time and during
commission of predicate acts described hereafter. It
is in the interest of justice that the individual
Defendants be made parties to this action in this
venue under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b).

INJURY DISCOVERY1 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1 Under RICO, the Supreme Court has held actions accrue upon
actual or reasonable .injury discovery..Rotella v. Wood,
528 U.S. 549,555-556 (2000) (.Federal courts, to be sure,
generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a statute is
silent on the issue, as civil RICO is here..) (citations
omitted).

2Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 675 (11th Cir. 2001) (.…This
court and others have long recognized that where such a
[fiduciary] relationship exists, any obligation of due
diligence may be excused, because the plaintiff is entitled
to assume that the fiduciary is protecting his interests..)

6. Through a continuing course of misrepresentations and
omissions regarding defendant judges‘
disqualification and loss of all attorney defendants‘
honest services, including the misrepresentations and
omissions described in this pleading, all defendants
as a goal of the Enterprise actively concealed from
the Plaintiff class the existence of their causes of
action. Given the fiduciary duties2 owed by defendant
judges and lawyers, the Plaintiff class could not
have discovered their causes of action against
defendants. Representative Plaintiffs and class
members were kept in ignorance of information

essential to the pursuit of these claims, without any
fault or lack of diligence on their part.3
Representative Plaintiffs and class members did not
discover the facts constituting defendants'
unconscionable practices until a date within the
limitations period governing this action, and
promptly exercised due diligence by filing this
original Complaint. As the result of defendants‘
breach of fiduciary duties, misrepresentations and
omissions, Representative Plaintiffs and class
members had no actual or presumptive knowledge of the
facts of defendants‘ misconduct and resulting injury
to even put them on inquiry notice.4
7. Representative Plaintiffs and class members could

3 Eleventh Circuit injury discovery precedent is adopted
from Seventh Circuit precedent of Judge Posner. See
Eleventh Circuit, Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 410
F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005); see adopted Seventh
Circuit precedent of Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v.
Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997); Law v. Medco
Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997); Marks v. CDW
Computer Centers, Inc., 122 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 1997).

4 Tello I, 410 F.3d at 1283 (citations omitted). See
generally Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Tello II),
494 F.3d at 956, 968 (11th Cir. 2007) (.Inquiry notice in
our circuit occurs when there is factual evidence of the
possibility of securities fraud that would cause a
reasonable person to investigate whether his or her legal
rights had been infringed..)(emphasis added).

Tello II, 494 F.3d at 968 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also Tello I, 410 F.3d at 1283 (.In turn,
inquiry notice triggers reasonable diligence in
investigating the fraud for which notice has been received
in order to obtain sufficient information to file
suit..)(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

not, following any .Period of Reasonable Diligence.5
have discovered defendants‘ misrepresentations,
material omissions and/or unconscionable breach of
fiduciary duties and duties of honest services before
the filing of this consolidated action and,
therefore, their claims accrued on the dates these
consolidated actions were filed. RICO‘s four year
statute of limitations under Eleventh Circuit
precedent of Tello I and Tello II does not begin to
run until prospective plaintiffs .obtain sufficient
information to file suit. or .ascertain sufficient
facts to file a complaint..6

5 The Eleventh Circuit properly designated the two distinct
time points in Tello I and II by citing both Seventh and
Eleventh Circuit precedent:

Time Point #1: .Inquiry notice is .the term used for
knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable
person to begin investigating the possibility that
his legal rights had been infringed..

Time Point #2:.Once inquiry notice occurs, a
prospective plaintiff enters a period of reasonable
diligence, which is the time necessary, exercising
ordinary investigation, to ascertain sufficient facts
to file a complaint.  

6 Id.

REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS AND THE DEFENDANTS

8. Each of the Representative Plaintiffs brings this
action on their own behalf and on behalf of all
persons within the class definition set forth below
(pp. 69 - 75).

9. Representative Plaintiffs Clements and Powell are
individuals who are residents of Jefferson County,
Alabama, having lived there for over 30 years.
10. Representative Plaintiff Belinda Stephens and her
then minor children, John, Michael, and Anthony
Stephens are and have been residents of Sylva, NC,
for over ten years, though at the time of Ms.
Stephens‘ divorce, they were all residents of
Jefferson County, Alabama.
11. Known defendants Charles Gorham, George Richard
Fernambucq, Richard Vincent, and Stephen Wright, and
their respective law firms Gorham and Cason, LLC,
Boyd, Fernambucq and Vincent, P.C., Najjar, Denaburg,
et al, P.C., (collectively, .Known Defendant
Attorneys.), as well as Judge R.A. Ferguson and John
C. Calhoun are individual residents of Jefferson
County, Alabama.
12. Unknown defendant attorneys include, but are not
limited to, law firms, law partners, members,
shareholders, and support staff of Known Defendant
Attorneys. Unknown defendant attorneys include other
unknown domestic relations attorneys along with
corporate entities or other legally recognized
entities such as partnerships or LLC‘s through which
such unknown defendant attorneys are engaged in the
practice of law in conspiracy with Known Defendant

Attorneys, Ferguson, Calhoun, and other defendants
(collectively, .Unknown Defendant Attorneys.).
(collectively, .Unknown Defendant Attorneys. and
.Known Defendant Attorneys. are hereinafter referred
to as .Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys.).
13. .Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors. are
other unknown persons who were aware of the
Enterprise operated as the Club and in the Defendant
Judges‘ courtrooms, including its practices of
granting inflated attorney‘s fees and agreeing
through ex parte communications to more favorable
results in cases of Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, splitting illegal Enterprise profits among
Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys along with
Ferguson and Calhoun, who financially benefited from
the Enterprise‘s wrongdoing, who maintained their
silence, and who conspired to and did provide
substantial assistance and the .cover. of legitimacy
to the criminal Enterprise; such Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors include, but
are not limited to, club members referred to by Known
Defendant Attorneys as Calhoun‘s cardiologist, a
welder, an anesthetist, a police officer, and an
accountant.

FACTS

14. Prior to 1993, Known Defendant Attorneys, Calhoun,

and Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors
were controlling members of a hunting club7 (.Club.);
thereafter, the Club was converted by such
controlling defendant attorneys, Calhoun, and
coconspirators to an illegal RICO Enterprise. (See
¶94 et seq)
15. Beginning in 1993 with Calhoun‘s judicial nomination
process and prior to the judicial appointment of John
Calhoun (nonimmune predicate acts of Calhoun), during
Calhoun‘s entire judicial tenure (predicate acts
though immune solely as to Calhoun‘s civil
liability), and after Calhoun‘s removal from office
post-2006 (nonimmune predicate acts of Calhoun),
Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys along with the
Nominating Committee Lawyers and the Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors have
continually used, profited by, divided among
themselves, and invested their illegal Enterprise
income into the Enterprise in numerous ways described
below.
(a) Calhoun has judicial immunity as to civil
liability for even his bribery based judicial
conduct. Judicial immunity is clearly
inapplicable to (i) nonjudicial conduct of

7 Known as The Alabama River hunting club to plaintiffs‘
best knowledge and belief.

Calhoun‘s .pay for play. Hobbs Act violations
before becoming a judge, (ii) bribery based
misconduct as a nonjudicial mediator/arbitrator
and money laundering following his removal from
judicial office post-1976, (iii) nonjudicial
administrative misconduct while serving as a
judge, e.g. election fraud, failure to make
required reports to the Alabama Ethics
Commission, tax fraud associated with his money
laundering, and nonjudicial Travel Act
violations. Judicial immunity does not extend
to misconduct taken in the absence of
jurisdiction, e.g. Ferguson‘s award of
discovery sanctions to nonparty lawyers rather
than to parties in interest.
(b) Judicial immunity must be pled as a
defense.
(c) Even immune judicial misconduct
constitutes .predicate acts. necessary to
establish the required .pattern of predicate
acts. necessary to prove racketeering.

16. Calhoun secured his judicial office by .pay for
play.. (See nonimmune Hobbs Act violation, infra p.
30)
17. Any .arrangement for, charging, or collecting”

contingent legal fees in divorce or criminal cases is
forbidden in Alabama. Calhoun and Ferguson
nevertheless conspired and arranged with Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys as well as Nomination
Committee Lawyer defendants to illegally grant such
lawyers‘ contingent, champertous legal fees which
said defendants did collect and share with Calhoun
and Ferguson as part of their .scheme to defraud.
plaintiff parties;
18. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys as well as
Nomination Committee Lawyers when representing the
husband would, due to such conspiracy and .scheme to
defraud,. not object on behalf of his or her
husband/client to the Ferguson or Calhoun order
requiring his or her husband/client to pay such
excessive illegal contingent fees to opposing
coconspiring counsel. (See infra, Clements ¶ 34;
Toler ¶‘s 35 and 36; and Powell ¶‘s 42 and 43).

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES FERGUSON AND CALHOUN

19. Beginning with his initial appointment, Calhoun was
a disqualified judge in all cases in which Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys as well as Nomination
Committee Lawyers appeared;
20. Beginning with his first joining the Enterprise
conspiracy, Ferguson was a disqualified judge in all

cases in which Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys
as well as Nomination Committee Lawyers appeared;
21. Circuit Court Judges R. A. Ferguson (.Ferguson.)
and John Calhoun reached agreements and
understandings in conspiracy with Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers,
and Calhoun to accomplish the Enterprise‘s Goals8 and
to share in illegal Enterprise income with other such
coconspirators. Judges Ferguson and Calhoun have in
the past and continue to date of filing taken
numerous actions in furtherance of this conspiracy.
22. Ferguson and Calhoun also bargained for and
accepted, and said Defendant attorneys paid Ferguson
and Calhoun, a quid pro quo share of such illegal
Enterprise profits. In making and accepting such
payments, Ferguson, Calhoun, and said Defendant
attorneys engaged in predicate acts of Hobbs Act
violations,9 Travel Act violations,10 money
laundering,11 monetary transactions violations,12 and
mail and wire fraud.13 (Two or more predicate acts,
i.e. .racketeering activities,. constitute a

8 See infra, ¶‘s 97- 101.

9 Infra, ¶ 59 et seq.

10 Infra, ¶ 67et seq.

11 Infra, ¶ 72 et seq.

12 Id.

13 Infra, ¶ 74 et seq.

.pattern.14)
23. In collusion and conspiracy with Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nomination Committee lawyers,
and other conspiring judges in the Tenth Judicial
Circuit, Ferguson participated in fraudulent
administrative transfer and exclusion of such
defendant attorneys‘ cases from the docket of new
Circuit Judge Suzanne Childers.15 Judge Childers
defeated Calhoun in 2006 elections and was not part
of the Enterprise‘s conspiracy. Since taking office
Judge Childers has not granted improperly favorable
rulings to such defendant attorneys nor approved
their excessive illegal attorneys‘ fees. (Nonimmune,
nonjudicial administrative conduct)
24. Calhoun and Ferguson were each .due process.
disqualified pursuant to opinions of the United
States Supreme Court disqualifying an Alabama Supreme
Court justice in Lavoie16, disqualified pursuant to

14 Infra, ¶102 et seq.

15 In Fall, 2007, Ferguson and said lawyers conspired to put
on a .skit. falsely, unethically, and slanderously
portraying Judge Childers as an alcoholic of some ill
repute. When the honest and honorable Judge Childers
properly and ethically asked for an apology, Ferguson and
other coconspirator judge(s) supported and accomplished
having all such attorneys‘ and their law firms‘ cases
permanently transferred away from Judge Childers so they
could only be heard by Enterprise member and/or
coconspirator judge(s).

16 Constitutional due process rights render the judgment
void when the disqualification .would offer a possible

temptation to the average [judge] … [to] lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true.. .…to perform its
high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.. Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986), 106 S.Ct. at 1587 (citations
omitted).

17 .Recusal is required under Canon 3C(1) when facts are
shown which make it reasonable for members of the public or
a party, or counsel opposed, to question the impartiality
of the judge.. Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala.
1984).

18 See e.g. Cotton v. Brown, 638 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala.
1994)(judge must initiate his own recusal).

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics statutes,17 and
disqualified pursuant to opinions of both the Alabama
Supreme Court18 and the Alabama Judicial Inquiry
Commission (.JIC.. JIC Advisory Opinions finding it
was .reasonable. to question a judge‘s impartiality
and thereby ruled the judge disqualified on facts
comparable to the admissions of Calhoun regarding his
acceptance of gifts and favors in the form of hunting
privileges are as follows:
(a) JIC Adv. Opin. 02-803: Judge disqualified
if he accepts gifts of ticket to college
football game or other events from lawyer with
a case pending in his court.
(b) JIC Adv. Opin. 94-518: Judge disqualified
if he accepts loan of computer equipment for
use solely in Judge‘s judicial functions if
from a lawyer with a case pending in his court
citing Adams v. Commission on Judicial
Performance, 882 P.2d 358, 379 (Cal. 1994), .a

judge‘s. . . knowing acceptance of favors and
benefits having a substantial monetary value
from a litigant or attorney whose case
presently is pending before the court is
inherently corruptive, suggesting improper use
of the prestige of office..(emphasis added).
(c) JIC Adv. Opin. 94-514: Judge disqualified
if he accepts gift of a smoked turkey from a
lawyer with a case pending in his court.

25. Disqualification arose from Calhoun‘s extremely
close, personal relationships with such lawyers19
(Club roommates for over twenty years; provision of
free club membership and invitations; joint
vacations) his financial interrelationships with such
lawyers both as to the RICO Enterprise conspiracy and
their sharing of laundered20 illegal Enterprise
profits with Calhoun.
26. Ferguson was disqualified for acceptance of
.laundered.21 financial payments accomplished through

19 U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1538, (7th Cir., 1985).
(.[W]e conclude that an objective observer reasonably
would doubt the ability of a judge to act with utter
disinterest and aloofness when [Judge] was such a close
friend of the prosecutor [Defendant Attorneys] that the
families of both were just about to take a joint
vacation . . ..).

20 Money Laundering, 18 USC § 1956. See infra, ¶72.

21 Id.

.financial transactions.22 and otherwise from illegal
Enterprise profits made by Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys and Nomination Committee Lawyers
to Ferguson and/or for Ferguson‘s benefit.
(a) Ferguson participated in money laundering
for and on behalf of Calhoun following
Calhoun‘s loss of office. Money laundering
included ordering payments to lawyers and
nonlawyer advisors, e.g. child psychologists,
who in turn transferred the money to Calhoun as
a .legal consultant. and/or as a mediator.

27. Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, and Nomination Committee Lawyers had a
fiduciary duty in each case to all parties, opposing
counsel, and to the courts to disclose their
disqualifying personal and financial
interrelationships. Their failure to disclose
rendered any judgment or order entered in such cases
by Calhoun and/or Ferguson either void or voidable.23
(a) This honorable federal court does not have
jurisdiction to render final Alabama domestic

22 Monetary Transactions, 18 USC §1957. See infra, ¶72.

23 Lavoie, supra, Note 16, at 828-829 (.we are aware of no
case, and none has been called to our attention, permitting
a court's decision to stand when a disqualified judge casts
the deciding vote;. Judges Ferguson and Calhoun, of course,
without a jury cast the one and only vote in their
courtrooms.)See discussion of Edwards and .Scheme to
Defraud., infra at ¶ 79.

relations cases void and is not being asked to
exercise any such jurisdiction. Jury findings
as to the disqualification of Ferguson and
Calhoun go to the federal question of
racketeering predicate acts, e.g. mail fraud as
the result of plaintiff class members paying
for valid decrees but receiving decrees of
.questionable validity. as found in Edwards on
nearly identical facts.24
(b) In Edwards, this very federal district
court for the Northern District of Alabama held
that corrupt Alabama domestic relations judges
and lawyers were guilty of mail fraud as the
result of a jury finding that their clients
paid for valid Alabama divorce decrees but
received decrees of .questionable validity..
This finding did not result in overturning or
reversing a single Alabama domestic relations
decree, but did result in federal mail fraud
convictions for such conspiring Alabama divorce
lawyers and judges.25

28. Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys as well as Nomination Committee Lawyers

24 See discussion of Edwards and .Scheme to Defraud., infra
at ¶ 79.

25 Id.

owed fiduciary26 duties and a duty of honest services
to all clients and opposing parties and all such
parties (Mr. and Mrs. Clement, Mr. and Mrs. Toler,
Powell, Belinda, John, Michael, and Anthony Stephens
and other members of the Plaintiff Class) necessarily
relied upon them to fulfill their fiduciary
obligations of full disclosure.
29. Beginning in approximately 1998, the Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys used and invested
additional illegal income from their Enterprise and
acquired a leasehold interest in a larger 2,700 acre
plantation for hunting from International Paper
Company for use of the Enterprise which they invested
in, operated, conducted, funded, and controlled
within the Enterprise;
30. At that time in early 1998, the four Known
Defendant Attorneys began directly paying all of
Calhoun‘s Club dues and costs (and paid those same
costs for the benefit of the Unknown Coconspirators
and Aiders and Abettors who were Club members and who
provided a .cover. of legitimacy), including
leasehold costs in excess of $27,000 per year; other

26 Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 675 (11th Cir. 2001) (.…This
court and others have long recognized that where such a
[fiduciary] relationship exists, any obligation of due
diligence may be excused, because the plaintiff is entitled
to assume that the fiduciary is protecting his interests..)

 
operating costs came up to a combined total of
$50,000 to $100,000 annually.
31. Under Alabama Ethics Commission law, as well as
Alabama and federal tax law, Ferguson, Calhoun and
the aforesaid Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys
were required to administratively report the fair
market value of all such financial benefits to the
Alabama Ethics Commission and include them as income
on tax reporting forms. Such reports to the Ethics
Commission were not made during Calhoun‘s tenure and
such amounts were never reported as required for
Alabama or federal income tax purposes (nonimmune,
nonjudicial administrative predicate acts by Calhoun,
and similarly by Ferguson,27 including money
laundering violations).
32. Toler, Clement, Powell, Belinda Stephens, and all
other legal clients and victims of the Enterprise
made payments to the Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys and Nomination Committee Lawyers and said
Defendants did deposit such illegal income using
.monetary transactions. by sending checks and
receiving checks drawn on and/or deposited into
national banking institutions through the U.S. mails
in payment for the .honest services. of such lawyers
and law firms which said Plaintiffs did not receive.

27 See supra, ¶ 26.

(See e.g. infra, ¶‘s 72 (monetary transactions
violations) and 74 (Honest Services mail fraud).

REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF CLEMENTS

33. At the beginning of Clements‘ case in 2006, both
Gorham and Calhoun failed and refused to make
required full disclosure of their respective
conflicts of interest to Mr. or Mrs. Clements and
failed and refused to disclose the necessary and
substantially adverse impact such conflicts had on
the legitimacy and validity of any orders coming out
of the case. (See infra, ¶78 et seq)
34. Clements paid Gorham legal fees and costs in excess
of $25,000 for a valid divorce decree and for honest
legal services which Clements did not receive, lost
well in excess of $100,000 in property and income as
a result of the void or voidable Calhoun judgment,
and unnecessarily incurred and wasted over $15,000 in
post-judgment legal fees based on a wholly
inadequate, incomplete appellate record due to said
Defendants‘ misrepresentations and failure to
disclose on the court record. These injuries were
proximately caused by the predicate acts of all
Defendants as described herein. ($140,000+ in
injuries).

MR AND MRS TOLER – CLASS MEMBERS

35. In September, 1994, Robert Toler paid Fernambucq a
$10,000 retainer for honest services and a valid
divorce decree which Toler did not receive. During
the litigation Toler paid Fernambucq an additional
$20,000, other costs of $12,000, and paid over
$45,000 in appellate and other postjudgment
attorneys‘ fees (based on a wholly inadequate and
incomplete appellate record caused by nondisclosure
and suppression of facts on the record), all damages
proximately caused by the predicate acts of all
Defendants as described herein.
36. At the conclusion of his case, Toler (husband) was
ordered by Calhoun to pay $7,300 additional
contingent legal fees to Gorham as Ms. Toler‘s
attorney; Gorham‘s client contracts provided that his
clients, such as Ms. Toler, did not receive credit
for any such contingent, additional fees ordered to
be paid by the court (Calhoun) and that the full
contract legal fee was still payable to Gorham by the
client, Ms. Toler, i.e. contractually the entire
$7,300 would go directly into Gorham‘s pocket; such a
contract constituted a fraud on Ms. Toler as well as
on the court and its equitable judicial processes.
($87,000 + $7,300 in injuries to property + over
$100,000 injury to Toler‘s business)
37. Calhoun did not recuse himself and neither

Fernambucq nor Gorham withdrew from the Toler case as
mandated by Alabama law and due process and they
knowingly suppressed and misrepresented their
conflicts of interest.
38. In May, 2004, Mr. Toler‘s separate child custody
case and defendants‘ related deceit as the result of
nondisclosure of material conflicts of interest by
Gorham and Calhoun began and continued through date
of issuance of an opinion; Calhoun peremptorily
entered a favorable judgment for Gorham‘s client in
what the appellate court later referred to as .entry
of a favorable judgment before the close of the
presentation of all of the evidence. thereby
.pretermitting the father‘s [Toler‘s] claim without
hearing..28 (Issuance of an Order is a Predicate act,
even though judicial conduct and immune as to
Calhoun‘s and/or Ferguson‘s civil liability).
39. Upon remand in early Fall, 2006, Calhoun ruled for
Mr. Toler solely because Calhoun was opposed in his
November, 2006, reelection and Mr. Toler worked
actively for Calhoun‘s opponent. Yet, in prohibited,
ex parte undisclosed communications in furtherance of
the Enterprise Calhoun assured Gorham that Calhoun
would reverse the Order in favor of Gorham‘s client,
Ms. Toler, immediately upon being reelected. This

28 Toler v. Toler, 947 So.2d 416, 429, (Ala.Civ.App., 2006.)

clearly constituted fraud on Ms. Toler, Mr. Toler,
the child, the judicial process, and fraud on Alabama
election processes.
40. Pursuant to Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics
(statutory law in Alabama) the only way for Calhoun
to have such conflicts of interest waived in the
Toler, Clement, Stephens, and Plaintiff Class cases
is to have made a full disclosure of his conflicts of
interest and his disqualification on the record prior
to accepting the case and thereafter obtained a
written waiver of the conflicts signed by all counsel
and by all parties; no such disclosure was made and
no such written waiver of conflicts was ever obtained
or placed in the record of Toler, Clements, Stephens
or any case during Calhoun‘s or Ferguson‘s tenure.

Representative Plaintiff Richard M Powell  

41. Representative plaintiff Richard M Powell
(hereinafter .Powell.) filed a motion for
modification of alimony before Ferguson on May 21,
2009. Neither Ferguson nor coconspirator attorney
representing defendant party Ms. Powell informed
either party that Ferguson was a disqualified judge
due to his racketeering conspiracy.
42. Ferguson ruled on the motion on June 8, 2009.
Ferguson fraudulently granted coconspirator attorney

for Defendant Powell‘s wife an inflated attorney fee
to be paid by Powell directly to the attorney of
$12,500. With no required pretrial discovery hearing
or record as mandated by Alabama law and with no
jurisdiction under Alabama law including Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure29 to do so, Ferguson
fraudulently awarded coconspirator attorney for
Defendant Powell‘s former wife a discovery .sanction.
of $12,500. Ferguson, without jurisdiction,
fraudulently ordered such sanction payable by Mr.
Powell directly to the defendant‘s coconspirator
attorney and not to the party in interest, defendant
Ms. Powell, as the supposedly wronged party.
Sanctions under federal or state rules are paid to
the party in interest but are used by Ferguson and
the Enterprise to illegally inflate conspiring
attorneys‘ incomes wholly without basis or notice and
constituted a violation of due process.30

29 See ARCP Rule 37. No discovery sanctions awarded without
a pretrial motion and order to compel discovery. Any
sanctions awarded, including .cost. of attorneys‘ fee, are
payable to the party, not to the attorney. Payment directly
to the attorney was a fraudulent award by Ferguson of
inflated attorneys‘ fees in furtherance of the Enterprise
and wholly without jurisdiction.

30 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116
S.Ct. 1589 {U.S., 1996.)There was no jurisdiction or due
process notice that Mr. Powell would be subjected to
payment of any punitive sanctions whatever, much less
payment to a nonparty. Only .cost. can be awarded as a
financial discovery sanction and only after a full hearing,
entry of a specific discovery order, and proof of violation

of such discovery order. .Cost. sanctions payable to the
opposing party, not their attorney.

not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that
a State may impose.

43. Ferguson‘s June 8, 2009, award of the sanction and
its payment directly to the coconspirator defendant‘s
attorney on behalf of the Enterprise violated the
right to honest services owed to Powell and Powell‘s
former wife as parties to the action and was wholly
without jurisdiction in Ferguson. (Hobbs Act, Travel
Act violations, Money Laundering and Monetary
Transaction violations; mail and wire fraud,
including loss of honest services fraud, with
particularity as to who, what, and when).

REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF BELINDA STEVENS AND HER THEN
MINOR CHILDREN JOHN STEVENS, MICHAEL STEPHENS, AND
ANTHONY STEPHENS

44. Representative plaintiff Belinda Stephens
(hereinafter .Stephens.) has resided in Sylva, NC,
for over 10 years and travels interstate to appear
before Jefferson County‘s domestic relations courts.
45. Stephens‘ 1998 divorce, child custody, and child
support case had been heard by John Calhoun and was
subject to the continuing jurisdiction in the court

of Judge Suzanne Childers who replaced Calhoun
effective January 1, 2007.
46. At the beginning of Ms. Stephens case in 1998,
during the case, and thereafter, Calhoun and Wright
did not inform either party of their longstanding
personal and financial interrelationship, the
resulting disqualification of Calhoun as judge, nor
any details of their racketeering conspiracy and its
adverse implications on the validity of any judgment
or order issued by Calhoun.
47. In 1998, Stephens lost over $100,000 in money and
property as the proximate result of Calhoun‘s, Known
and Unknown Attorney Defendants‘, Nomination
Committee lawyers‘, and Unknown Coconspirators,
Aiders, and Abettors‘ predicate acts of sale of
Calhoun‘s office, Travel Act violations, money
laundering, monetary transactions, and mail and wire
fraud.
48. Ms. Stephens had seven (7) children born during the
marriage that she cared for at home and she could not
and did not work outside the home. She not only
lacked formal work experience outside the home, but
lacked a formal higher education.
49. In October, 2004, a hearing was held before Calhoun
to modify the divorce order to require that her

affluent, multimillionaire husband pay for the
college education of Ms. Stephens‘ triplets who were
still minors.31
50. Ms. Stephens arrived at court to discover Calhoun as
judge engaged in an ex parte conference with Wright,
Wright‘s defendant client Mr. Stephens, and Mr.
Stephens‘ new wife, with whom he‘d admittedly had a
long-time affair during his marriage to Ms. Stephens.
Calhoun refused to apprise Ms. Stephens or her
attorney of the matters discussed at length ex parte.
51. The trial was as unfair and biased as the ex parte
pretrial conference among Wright, Calhoun, and the
defendant parties had assured. Calhoun threatened Ms.
Stephens, a mother of seven (7), saying he would
.throw [her] ass in jail. merely as the result of a
simple question to her lawyer.
52. Ms. Stephens‘ lawyer, after observing Calhoun‘s
openly hostile, clearly partial conduct and after
being threatened by Calhoun, advised Ms. Stephens to
withdraw her motion because Calhoun intended to take
away what little child support she was receiving if
she did not withdraw the motion.
53. As the direct proximate result of failure to

31 John (1st Triplet) was an A,B student, Michael (2nd
Triplet) was an A,B student, Anthony, (3rd Triplet) was a
straight A student.

disclose their disqualifying relationship and
Calhoun‘s and Wright‘s other predicate acts in
furtherance of the Enterprise‘s illegal goals, the
Stephens triplets, John, Michael and Anthony, each as
minors, lost more than $75,000 in money and property
as legally mandated support necessary for them to
complete their high school and college educations.
54. As the direct proximate result of failure to
disclose their disqualifying relationship and
Calhoun‘s and Wright‘s other predicate acts in
furtherance of the Enterprise‘s illegal goals, Ms.
Stephens put herself inextricably in debt to provide
her children with their legal right under Alabama law
to a high school and college education. As a direct
result of Calhoun‘s and Wright‘s predicate acts in
furtherance of the Enterprise‘s illegal goals Ms.
Stephens is losing her and the childrens‘ home due to
foreclosure in August, 2009, at the time of filing
this action. The loss proximately caused to Ms.
Stephens by the Enterprise and predicate acts of
stated defendants is in excess of $250,000 in money
and property.
55. In 2006, Ms. Stephens again filed a motion on behalf
of herself and her children for high school and
college support education costs. Judge Childers was
not a member of or coconspirator with the Enterprise

and had not continued Calhoun‘s, Ferguson‘s, or other
Enterprise coconspirators‘ biased rulings or grant of
inflated illegal attorneys‘ fees.
56. Ferguson, Nomination Committee lawyers, and Known
and Unknown Attorneys successfully conspired and took
action with other coconspirator judge(s) to have all
such lawyers‘ cases transferred to such conspiring
judges and away from nonconspirator Judge Childers.32

32 See supra, ¶ 23.

33 See U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1530-1531, (7th Cir.

ENTERPRISE IS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

57. The Enterprise consisting of the Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, the Club, and the domestic
relations courts of Defendants Calhoun and Ferguson
is engaged in interstate commerce in all its
activities, e.g. the Club‘s purchases of whiskey,
food, and interstate travel; the court‘s and firms‘
dealings with parties and witnesses from multiple
states (Stevens has lived in North Carolina for over
10 years), as well as the courts‘ and related law
firms‘ own administrative functions, including
purchasing of equipment, supplies, furniture and
furnishings, in interstate commerce, and Enterprise
financial transactions with interstate banks and
other interstate financial institutions.33

1985) (.the bribes paid to [judge] Murphy .depleted the
assets. of the lawyers who paid them, and that the lawyers
regularly purchased items in interstate commerce. . .
regularly purchased law books from out of state. . .
purchased envelopes and stationery from New York. This and
other evidence showed a regular connection between the
lawyers and interstate commerce. . . The statute reaches
those who affect commerce .in any degree,. and in a complex
economy almost any movement of funds affects commerce to
some degree.) U.S. v. Conn, 769 F.2d 420, 423, (7th Cir.
1985).(.Cook County Circuit Court purchased equipment and
office supplies from companies located outside the State of
Illinois. The interstate commerce requirement was met..)

58. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys and
Nomination Committee Lawyers communicated and
transmitted documents to Clements, Toler, Powell, and
Belinda Stephens (as well as Mrs. Clements, Mrs.
Toler, Mrs. Powell and Mr. Stephens) and all other
legal clients and victims of the Enterprise, through
use of the U.S. mails and telephone.

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY No. 1 - INTERFERENCE

WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE THROUGH

HOBBS ACT EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF RIGHT-§1951

59. Hobbs Act-interference with commerce through
extortion (§1951):

(a) Whoever in any way or degree. .
. affects commerce . . . by . . .
extortion or attempts or conspires
so to do . . . in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section . . .
(b) As used in this section--

 (2) The term "extortion" means the
obtaining of property from another,

with his consent . . . under color
of official right.34

34 18 U.S.C. §1951 (emphasis added).

35 Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (2003).

60. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the words of
the Hobbs Act .do not lend themselves to restrictive
interpretation. because they =manifes[t] ... a
purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress
has to punish interference with interstate commerce
by extortion [under color of right]. . .‘ .35
61. In 1993 before his judicial nomination or
appointment (no judicial immunity), Calhoun reached
an understanding and agreement, i.e. a conspiracy,
with Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys and
Nomination Committee Lawyers. Said Defendant lawyers
agreed to support Calhoun‘s nomination for a vacant
domestic relations judgeship in Alabama‘s Tenth
Judicial Circuit, provide future reelection financial
support, and in the future share their illegal
Enterprise profits with Calhoun. Calhoun in turn
agreed that he would give said Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys and Nomination Committee Lawyers
preferred treatment in his court. Such conspiracy and
subsequent actions of all the foregoing included
grant of better outcomes for their clients and
inflated, champertous legal fees; in more current

vernacular, .pay for play..
62. Under Evans, in the Eleventh Circuit that is a
completed Hobbs Act violation prior to Calhoun‘s
judicial appointment.36 (Nonimmune Hobbs Act
violation). Unlike bribery, official conduct or
action as a quid pro quo is not an element of a Hobbs
Act violation. (See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S.
255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57, (1992).
63. A defendant does not have to be a public official
to violate the Hobbs Act in conjunction and
conspiracy with and/or by aiding and abetting a
public official.37

36 In Evans, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit‘s statement of a Hobbs Act violation - '
1951. (The Supreme Court Held: An affirmative act of
inducement by a public official . . . is not an element of
the offense of extortion under color of official right. . .
and neither is provision of any quid pro quo, i.e. conduct
by the public official or private party is not an element
of extortion. Evans, at 255).

37 See U.S. v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 768-769 (6th Cir. 2007).
.The government remains free to charge private individuals
with violating the Hobbs Act when they conspire with public
officials or aid and abet them in an extortion scheme; it
just must satisfy the .property from another. and .with his
consent. requirements in doing so. See United States v.
Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1032 (6th Cir.1996) (upholding a
conviction of a Kentucky governor's husband for a
conspiracy to extort political contributions and
investments in a thoroughbred partnership in exchange for
access to state contracts); United States v. Kelley, 461
F.3d 817, 826 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding the conviction of a
county executive's wife for .conspiring with a public
official to commit extortion. where the public contracts

were to be granted in exchange for private financial gain).

38 U.S. v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1037-1038. (7th Cir.
1976).. .We think that it is no less of a crime under the
Hobbs Act to sell one's public trust before, rather than
after, one is installed in public office. The issue
squarely put is: Can a private citizen, who has been
nominated for office,[John Calhoun-in 1993]but not elected,
extort money under color of official right. . . . within
the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates
for political office to conspire to affect commerce by
extortion induced under color of official right during a
time frame beginning before the election. . ..(Emphasis
added)

39 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

64. Calhoun, Nomination Committee Lawyers, and Known
and Unknown Defendant Attorneys can and did violate
the Hobbs Act by conspiring with Calhoun in selling
Calhoun‘s public office before he was appointed or
elected to office.38
65. Members of the Plaintiff class, including Toler,
Clement, and Powell consented to payments to Known
and Unknown Defendant Attorneys as agents for the
Enterprise by reason of extortion through fraudulent,
void or voidable Calhoun and Ferguson court orders
under color of official right.39
66. Acceptance of said financial benefits and payments
by Ferguson, Calhoun, Unknown Coconspirators and
Aiders and Abettors, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, and Nominating Committee Lawyers, also
constituted money laundering and illegal monetary
transactions as described infra, ¶ 72, et seq.

66. Injuries Specific, concrete injuries to money,
property, and business proximately caused thereby
include Clement - $140,000+; Toler - $194,300+;
Powell - $75,000+; Stephens - $250,000+; Stephens
triplets - $75,000+ each.40

40 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

41 Effect on interstate commerce is a jurisdictional
requirement of the Travel Act, and .is a substantive
element of Travel Act offenses that must be decided by a
jury.. The interstate commerce requirement is merely
jurisdictional and can be satisfied with minimal effect on
interstate commerce, and the minimal effect need not be
adverse. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d
1243, 1244 (11th Cir.2000) (Plaintiffs need only to
establish a minimal effect on interstate commerce).

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY NO. 2

TRAVEL ACT. - § 1952.

67. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises.-

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or
foreign commerce or uses the mail or
any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce,41 with intent to—

(1) distribute the proceeds of any
unlawful activity; or

 (3) otherwise promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management,
establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity, and

thereafter performs or attempts to
perform--

(A) an act described in
paragraph (1) or (3) [violates
this act];  

(b) As used in this section. . .
"unlawful activity" means –

(2) extortion, bribery, or arson in
violation of the laws of the State in
which committed or of the United
States, or . . . under section 1956
or 1957 of this title [monetary
transactions and money laundering] . . . 

68. The phrase .in interstate commerce. has been held to
include use of an interstate facility even if such
use is solely intrastate.

[T]he Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.2001),
interpreted that language [in interstate
commerce] as covering any use-intrastate
or interstate-of an interstate commerce
facility. The Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th
Cir.2003), similarly read . . . [in
interstate commerce]jurisdiction language
as .requir[ing] that the facility, and
not its use, be in interstate or foreign
commerce.. Id. at 660.42

42 U.S. v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1311, (11th Circuit,
2005)(emphasis added). Drury, Marek, and Richeson were all
interpreting the same .in interstate commerce. language in
the context of § 1958 which itself was modeled after the
Travel Act.

69. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, Ferguson, Calhoun, and the Unknown

Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors did travel in
interstate or foreign commerce and used the mails,
interstate highways, interstate financial
institutions, and/or used other facilities in
interstate commerce,43 with intent to and did
promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment or carrying
on of .unlawful activit(ies).. (Nonimmune,
nonjudicial conduct).
70. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, Ferguson, Calhoun, and the Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors did perform
and attempt to perform unlawful activities. The
.unlawful activities. constituted extortion in the
second degree and bribery under Alabama law,
extortion under color of right violating the Hobbs
Act, money laundering, mail fraud, and wire fraud.
a. Bribery (Alabama Code, 1975, §13A-10-61(a)(1)):
Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, and the Unknown Coconspirators
and Aiders and Abettors conferred Calhoun‘s
judicial nomination, Calhoun‘s gratis Club
privileges, and other financial benefits and
payments on Defendants Calhoun and Ferguson; Club
privileges, campaign contributions, and direct

43 See e.g. supra, ¶ 57.

financial payments were .things of value., and
cost said defendant attorneys more than $1,000
per year; said defendant attorneys intended to
provide this benefit in return for favorable
judgments, illegal champertous attorney fees, and
other judicial favors from said defendants
Calhoun and Ferguson.
b. Bribery (Alabama Code, 1975, §13A-10-61(a) (2)):
Defendant Judges Calhoun and Ferguson agreed to
provide and did provide favorable judgments,
contingent legal fees, and other financial
benefits to Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers, Calhoun,
and the Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and
Abettors in exchange for Calhoun‘s judicial
appointment, Calhoun‘s gratis Club privileges,
campaign contributions, other financial benefits,
and .things of value. to both Ferguson and
Calhoun which cost said defendant attorneys more
than $1,000 per year.
c. Extortion in the Second Degree (Alabama Code
§§13; 13A-8-15(a)): Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers, Calhoun,
and the Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and
Abettors procured money by threat to Clement,
Toler, Powell, Stephens, and Plaintiff Class
members with the intent to deprive Plaintiff

class of that money; that threat was accomplished
by court order or threat of court order, which is
a .menace . . . to take action as an official
against anyone or anything, or withhold official
action, or cause such action or withholding..
(Alabama Code, 1975, §13A-8-1(13)(i)).

71. Injuries. Travel Act violations described herein
proximately caused and were a substantial factor in
the chain of causation resulting in injury of
Plaintiff class members‘ property and business
interests [Clement - $140,000+; Toler - $194,300+;
Powell - $75,000; Stephens - $250,000+; and the
Stephens triplets - $75,000+ each].44

44 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

45 See e.g. ¶ 29 et seq.

46 Hobbs Act, Travel Act, Mail and Wire Fraud.

47 See supra, ¶‘s 57, 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY No.‘s 3 and 4 – MONEY LAUNDERING

AND MONETARY TRANSACTIONS-18 U.S.C. §1956 and §1957  

72. Inside the United States, through United States
financial institutions, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers, Calhoun,
Ferguson, and the Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders
and Abettors knowingly used proceeds of a value
greater than $10,00045 derived from their criminal
offenses46 in monetary transactions affecting
interstate commerce47 to promote and carry on their

and infra, ¶‘s 74 et seq.

48 §7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax.
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty of a felony.

49 §7206. Fraud and false statements. Any person who--.(1).-
-Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or
other document, which contains or is verified by a written
declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury,
and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to
every material matter;. has violated §7206.

unlawful activities through the Enterprise with the
clear intent to and they did violate §720148 and
§720649 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(nonjudicial, nonimmune conduct); and knew and
designed the financial transactions of investing in
and operating the Club to conceal and disguise the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
and/or the control of the proceeds of the unlawful
activities specified in 42 U.S.C. §1956(c)(7); and
intended to and did avoid transaction reporting
requirements under State and/or Federal law, e.g.
failure to file required 1099 forms to report illegal
income paid to Defendants Calhoun and Ferguson. All
aforesaid Defendants did thereby violate 18 U.S.C. §§
1956 and 1957 (money laundering and monetary
transactions).
73. Injuries. Specific, concrete injuries to money,
property, and business proximately caused thereby
include Clement - $140,000+; Toler - $194,300+;

Powell - $75,000+; Stephens - $250,000+; Stephens
triplets - $75,000+ each.50

50 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

51 The substantive elements of mail and wire fraud are identical.
See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1498 (11th Cir.1991).
Both offenses consist of (1) intentional participation in a (2)
scheme [or artifice] to defraud another (3) of .money or
property. [§1346-.property. specifically includes the intangible
right of .honest services.], and (4) using mails and wires in
furtherance of such scheme.

52 U.S. v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 264 (3d Cir. 2001). In
honest services fraud, where there is a fiduciary duty to
disclose, whether in the private or public sector, active
fraud is not required-.[A]n official‘s [judge or lawyer‘s]
intentional violation of the duty to disclose provides the
requisite intent..

53 See infra, ¶ 78.

54 This requirement is merely jurisdictional – the mailing
itself need not be fraudulent.

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY No‘s 5 and 6 – MAIL

AND WIRE FRAUD

74. Elements of a civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim predicated
upon mail or wire fraud51 are: (1) using mails or
wires, (2) Defendants intentionally participated52,
(3) in a scheme to defraud,53 and (4) plaintiffs
suffered injury in money, property (including loss of
Honest Services) or business interests as the
proximate result thereof.
75. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, Calhoun, Ferguson, and the Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors, through the
Enterprise, used mails and wires in furtherance54 of

the scheme to defraud.55
76. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, Calhoun, Ferguson, and the Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors did intend to
participate.56 In the context of the said Defendants‘
false and fraudulent statements, including failure to
disclose and suppression of material conflicts of
interest as described herein, the Defendants in each
and every instance made the material
misrepresentation or suppressed the material facts
willfully and knowingly in concert with their
longstanding conspiracy and enterprise to deceive,
recklessly without knowledge or innocently by
mistake; such omissions and misstatements were
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary
prudence and comprehension and were intended for
members of the Plaintiff class to rely on the false
statements, and class members did reasonably rely and
were proximately injured in their money, business and
property. (Judicial immunity, if applicable, must be
pled as a defense for Ferguson and Calhoun).
77. Injuries. Specific, concrete injuries to money,

55 See supra, ¶‘s 57, 68, 69, and 72 and infra, ¶ 78
(sending fraudulently obtained court orders; sending fees
extorted under color of right).

56 Intent can be averred generally. See Grover v. Commercial
Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 108 F.R.D. 366, 369,
(D.C.Me.,1985).

property, and business proximately caused thereby
include Clement - $140,000+; Toler - $194,300+;
Powell - $75,000+; Stephens - $250,000+; Stephens
triplets - $75,000+ each.57

57 See supra, ¶‘s 34-36, 42, and 53-54.

58 Id, AL MRPC, Rule 1.7.

59 Intent can be averred generally. See Grover v. Commercial
Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 108 F.R.D. 366, 369,
(D.C.Me.,1985)..

60 See e.g. ¶ 19 – 53. (deceit through specified material
misrepresentations at specified times, stating who engaged

PLEADING SCHEME TO DEFRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY.  

78. Defendants Calhoun, Ferguson, Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, and Nominating Committee Lawyers
have a fiduciary obligation and legal duty to fully
inform and communicate with all clients and all
parties. Such lawyers also have a duty not to accept
a case if it involves a conflict of interest.58
Similarly, all Defendant judges have an obligation to
initiate their own recusal when their partiality
might reasonably be questioned. (Cotton, supra, p.
10, ¶ 24).
a. .Intent. is pled generally.59 .[A]n official‘s [or
lawyer‘s] intentional violation of the duty to
disclose provides the requisite intent.. See U.S.
v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 264 (3d Cir. 2001).

79. Scheme to defraud.60 Deceit includes .paying for one

in the deceit and who was deceived and defrauded thereby).

thing and receiving another.. (See a. below)
a. As the Fifth Circuit (binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit) stated in Edwards (U.S. v. K.C.
Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 881 (5th Cir 1972))
[originated in this Northern District of Alabama
also involved corrupt Alabama divorce lawyers and
judges guilty of mail fraud], 

 .The indictment thus charges that the
prospective divorcees paid for one thing
and received another. It is well recognized
that any scheme to deceive as to the
substantial identity of the thing received
may be prohibited by the mail fraud statute
. . . Defendants' customers [clients] in
the instant case were led to believe they
were receiving valid . . . divorce decrees.
In fact, they were receiving . . . decrees
. . . of questionable validity. It is not
enough for defendants to allege that the
law of Alabama as to the validity of these
divorces is unsettled and that no one knows
whether they are valid or not... 

80. Just as stated in Edwards, (supra), Representative
Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class .paid
for one thing and received another..
81. Plaintiff class members (in reliance on
nondisclosure of conflicts of interest, and the
resulting materially false appearance of honest
judges and lawyers) paid for valid enforceable

divorce decrees under Alabama law, but the decrees
and orders issued were of .questionable validity. –
the decrees were either void or voidable.61 (The
Edwards jury found and the court held the Alabama
decrees to be .questionable. solely for purposes of
federal mail fraud – finding did not result in
voiding a single Alabama divorce decree and
Plaintiffs do not assert or ask this court to
invalidate a single Alabama divorce decree.)
82. Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the false
appearance of honest dealings related to Defendants‘
material nondisclosure which was reasonably
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence
and comprehension and on which Clement, Toler,
Powell, and Stephens and other class members were
intended to and did rely proximately resulting in
loss of money, property and business.
83. Decrees and orders issued to class members Clement,
Toler, Powell, and Stephens were issued by
disqualified judges Calhoun and Ferguson62 whose
material disqualification was intentionally

61 See e.g. Lavoie at 827-828, supra, Note 16 (.we are aware
of no case, and none has been called to our attention,*828
permitting a court's decision to stand when a disqualified
judge casts the deciding vote..); Smith v. Clark
468 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.,1985.)(judgment is void if
violation of due process)

62 See supra, ¶ 19.

suppressed and such Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon
the materially false impression and were proximately
injured thereby in their money, business, and
property.
84. Plaintiff class members, including Clement, Toler,
Powell, and Stephens, in reasonable reliance of
expecting to receive valid divorce decrees and
orders, paid their Defendant Lawyers Fernambucq,
Wright, Vincent, Gorham, Unknown Defendant Attorneys,
and unknown Nomination Committee lawyers for valid,
enforceable divorce decrees and judgments rendered in
compliance with Alabama law. They received void or
voidable decrees and orders, i.e. decrees and orders
of .questionable validity., due to said Defendants‘
intentional failure and refusal to disclose material
conflicts of interest, judges Calhoun and Ferguson‘s
failures to recuse themselves, and said Defendant
Lawyers‘ wrongful acceptance of such cases which
constituted a violation of due process and breaches
of ethical and fiduciary standards imposed upon
lawyers and judges.
85. Plaintiffs were proximately injured in their money,
business, and property as a result of their
reasonable reliance on Defendants‘ material refusal
to act or to disclose. [Clement - $140,000+; Toler -
$194,300+; Powell - $75,000+; Stephens - $250,000+;

Stephens triplets - $75,000+ each]63
86. .Scheme or artifice to defraud another of property
using the mails and wires.. .Property. includes the
intangible right to .honest services. in both the
public and private sectors. 18 U.S.C. §1346.
87. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
Fifth Circuit before it -

63 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

64 As did lawyer members of the Nominating Committee who
made their decision based on their own undisclosed personal
conflicts of interest in 1993 as did judges Calhoun and
Ferguson in innumerable court orders involving their
undisclosed personal conflicts of interest.

65 U.S. v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169, (11th Cir,

consistently have held that schemes by
government officials to deprive the
public of its right to their honest
services, when a mailing is involved,
constitute mail fraud. See, e.g., United
States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443 (11th
Cir.1996); Waymer, 55 F.3d 564; Steiner
v. United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774, 63
S.Ct. 1439, 87 L.Ed. 1721 (1943);
Shushan, 117 F.2d 110.

* * * * *

See Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115 (noting that
.[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than
a public official.). . . If the official
instead secretly makes his decision based
on his own personal interests-as when an
official . . . personally benefits from
an undisclosed conflict of interest64 -
the official has defrauded the public of
his honest services.65

1997).

66 Supra, ¶15

67 Infra, ¶ 101.

88. The scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and the electorate
began in 1993 by deceit by the unknown Nominating
Committee Lawyers in failing to disclose their
material conflicts of interest in nominating Calhoun,
i.e. loss of their honest services, and by Calhoun‘s
material nondisclosure of his commitment to provide
future financial benefits to Nominating Committee
Lawyers, constituting loss of Calhoun‘s honest
services.66
89. Nondisclosure of material conflicts of interest and
resulting loss of .Honest Services. of Defendants
Calhoun, Ferguson, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, and Nominating Committee Lawyers continued
thereafter in furtherance of the Enterprise‘s goal of
suppression.67 (Judicial immunity, if applicable,
must be pled as a defense for Ferguson and Calhoun;
nevertheless their misconduct constitute .predicate
acts.).
a. Failure to make full disclosure of their
financial interest in the Enterprise and their
associated income constituted a violation of
mandatory Alabama judicial financial disclosure
filings. (Nonimmune, nonjudicial administrative

acts of Ferguson and Calhoun).

90. All the injuries to Plaintiffs‘ money, property and
business were the proximate68 result of and related
to the loss of Honest Services69 of Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers,
Ferguson, and Calhoun. Plaintiff class members‘
specific injuries in money, property and business
were directly related to Defendants‘ general and
pervasive nondisclosure of their material conflicts
of interest.
91. Injury - Loss of .Honest Services. of Defendant
Judges and Lawyers. The property taken from
Plaintiffs by Calhoun, Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, and Nominating Committee Lawyers included
Plaintiffs‘ rights to their Honest Services. All the
injuries to Plaintiffs‘ property and business
described herein were the proximate70 result of and

68 .Proximate cause. need only be a .substantial factor in
the sequence of causation.. (See Cox, infra p. 67, ¶ 112)
It need not be the sole cause nor even the primary cause.
Thus, injuries to Plaintiffs property and business can be
proximately related to more than one predicate act.

69 All injuries, whether mail or wire fraud, Hobbs Act,
money laundering and monetary transactions, and/or Travel
Act, are branches radiating from this initial loss of
honest services. See ¶ 86, supra.

70 .Proximate cause. need only be a .substantial factor in
the sequence of causation.. (See Cox, infra, p. 81, ¶112)
It need not be the sole cause nor even the primary cause.
Thus, injuries to Plaintiffs property and business can be
proximately related to more than one predicate act.

related to the predicate acts of loss of the Honest
Services of Defendants Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys, and Nominating Committee
Lawyers through mail fraud and wire fraud and as a
result of said Defendants‘ nondisclosure of their
conflicts of interest; and such material
nondisclosure was reasonably calculated to deceive
persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension and on
which Clement, Toler, Powell, Stephens and members of
the Plaintiff class were intended to and did rely
proximately resulting in loss of property and
business.

SPECIFIC, CONCRETE PROXIMATE INJURIES TO BUSINESS
AND PROPERTY ARISING FROM PREDICATE ACTS
CONSTITUTES AN ARTICLE III .CONTROVERSY. AND A RICO
CAUSE OF ACTION.

92. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in
American United Life Insurance Co, in the context of
a RICO action,

.[t]o establish that a =controversy‘
exists, a plaintiff must show that he
suffered an =injury in fact‘—an
invasion of a legally protected
interest,. [e.g. loss of right to
honest services and injury to
property].71

71 American United Life Insurance Co., v. Martinez , 480 F.3d
1043; [*23] 2007 WL 677729 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added).

a. An injury in fact is .invasion of a legally
protected interest., e.g. fraud. An .injury
in fact. is not a mere loss of money or
property.72 In the case of Mr. Toler‘s loss of
Honest Services of Calhoun73, Mr. Fernambucq,
and Mr. Gorham, his proximate injuries in
litigation costs and attorneys‘ fees were
paid by consent of Mr. Toler under color of
right and exceeded $194,300; specific,
concrete injuries of Mr. Clement exceeded
$140,000; specific concrete injuries of Mr.
Powell exceeded $75,000; specific concrete
injuries of Ms. Stephens exceeded $250,000;
specific concrete injuries of the Stephens
triplets exceeded $75,000 each.74 The
foregoing specific, concrete injuries to
business or property plus injuries of other
class members were directly related to and
proximately caused by Defendants‘ Ferguson,
Calhoun, Known and Unknown Defendant

72 Black‘s Law Dictionary defines an .injury. as,

The violation of another's legal right, for
which the law provides a remedy; a wrong or
injustice . . . . [A]uthorities distinguish
harm from injury, holding that while harm
denotes any personal loss or detriment, injury
involves an actionable invasion of a legally
protected interest.

73 See supra, ¶ 79 et seq.

74 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

Attorneys, and Nominating Committee Lawyers‘
nondisclosure of their material conflicts of
interest at the outset of Toler‘s, Clement‘s,
Powell‘s, Stephen‘s and other plaintiff class
members‘ cases or at anytime while the case
was pending and the Final Judgment issued.

ALABAMA FRAUD, SUPPRESSION, AND DECEIT- §§6-5-101, 102,
AND 104, CODE OF ALABAMA, 1975  

93. Defendants Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, and Nominating Committee
Lawyers, being under a fiduciary duty to disclose all
facts to Plaintiff class members, failed to disclose
and actively suppressed material facts pertaining to
the disqualification of Calhoun and Ferguson and
other material facts as specified herein constituted
fraud, fraudulent suppression and deceit. (Specific
injuries, see supra, plus punitive damages).

THE RACKETEERING ENTERPPRISE

94. The racketeering Enterprise exists to illegally
maximize the income and net worth of all the
Defendants.
95. The racketeering Enterprise consists of (a) an
association in fact of all the individual Defendants
(including Calhoun, the Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers and the
Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors

treated as principals), and who have a long and
unique association with one another, thus making the
Enterprise distinct and separate from any individual
defendant. See, U.S. v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (11th
Cir. 1988); (b) this association of individuals is
effected and maintained through the Club of which 10
Defendants (four dues paying Known Defendant
Attorneys and six Unknown Defendant Attorneys), 2
nondues paying circuit court judges, and 4 or 5 other
nondues paying members as Unknown Coconspirators and
Aiders and Abettors (including a welder, anesthetist,
police officer, doctor, and accountant) are members,
and which is controlled by said Defendant members,
and which has an organizational structure; and (c)
the Enterprise is also made up of the Alabama court
rooms of Defendant Judge Ferguson and Calhoun which
are controlled by and for the accomplishment of all
Defendants‘ goals and goals of the association in
fact and have their own organizational structure;

ENTERPRISE‘S COMMON GOALS

96. The Enterprise‘s policies are designed to and all
Defendants conspire to accomplish and do accomplish
the common goals set forth in ¶ 97 - 101 below.
97. The first goal of the racketeering Enterprise which
said Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, the
Nomination Committee Lawyers, Ferguson and Calhoun

conspired to accomplish and did succeed in
accomplishing was to have Defendant Calhoun nominated
to fill the 1993 judicial vacancy and thereafter to
be reelected.75 Calhoun was nominated based on the
understanding among all aforesaid Defendants that
Defendant Judge Ferguson‘s and Calhoun‘s role in the
Enterprise was to provide special favorable treatment
to all aforesaid defendant attorneys and their
clients76, including the fraudulent award of inflated
attorneys‘ fees in domestic relations matters. The
aforesaid defendant attorneys‘ role in the Enterprise
was to thereafter .use and invest. illegal Enterprise
income, both as campaign contributions and otherwise,
to elect and maintain the lucrative status of
defendant judges Ferguson and Calhoun as Jefferson
County Circuit Court Judge and to otherwise share
Enterprise profits with Ferguson and Calhoun.77

75 U.S. v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164,1169, (11th Cir,
1997). .[M]ore important[ly]. . . Defendants tried to
prevent [election of] Susan Anthony, a candidate who
opposed the interests of Lukis‘ clients. . . . In the
instant case Defendants violated the public trust by trying
to cause the election of Calhoun and Ferguson in
furtherance of the unlawful Enterprise.

76 U.S. v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1996). Defendant
state judges gave preferred treatment to state lawyers who
received special appointments and approval of their fees-
conspiracy violated §1962(d).

77 Names of Defendant Attorneys appear on lists of
contributors filed with the election commission and signed
by judge Calhoun. As part of the suppression of information
about the Hunting club, John Calhoun falsely claimed at a
candidates‘ forum at the Vestavia Civic Center in October,

2006, that he was unaware/did not know that lawyers with
many cases in his court had contributed to his campaign.

78 Business meals and entertainment as well as charitable
contributions are deductible (I.R.C. §274), but bribes and
kickbacks are not (I.R.C. §§162(c)and 170). Plaintiff
asserts Defendants hid some of their kickbacks as business
entertainment and charitable contributions, but examination
of personal and law firm tax returns is required to obtain
specific proof.

(nonjudicial nonimmune reelection predicate acts)
98. The second goal is to increase, and Defendants did
increase, Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys‘ and
the Nomination Committee Lawyers‘ market share of the
domestic relations law practice in the Tenth Judicial
Circuit. Due to Ferguson‘s and Calhoun‘s fulfilling
their Enterprise role, said defendant lawyers could
produce clearly more favorable results for their
respective domestic relations clients.
99. The third goal is to provide, and said Defendants
did provide, further illegal valuable benefits and
division of Enterprise profits to Ferguson and
Calhoun, to illegally minimize taxation of Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys along with the Nomination
Committee Lawyers and Defendants Calhoun and
Ferguson, and to obscure and conceal quid pro quo
compensation to Calhoun and Ferguson through illegal
money laundering and monetary transactions, in
violation of §§26 U.S.C. 7201 and 7206.78 Enterprise
profits were used to provide unreported taxable

benefits to Ferguson, Calhoun and the Coconspirators,
Aiders and Abettors (e.g. unreported Club benefits
and payments to and for Calhoun; unreported benefits
and payments to Ferguson by said Defendant Attorneys.
100. The fourth goal is to, and Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers,
Ferguson and Calhoun did devise and apply a
fraudulent scheme and dishonest method of awarding
excessive, inflated contingent attorney fees,
including attorney contracts which did not provide a
corresponding credit to the client for such payment,
i.e. double-dipping.
101. The fifth goal is to conspire through the
Enterprise a scheme to defraud the public and all
Plaintiffs through Known and Unknown Defendant
Attorneys‘, Nominating Committee Lawyers‘, along
with Ferguson and Calhoun, maintaining their
prohibited relationship and conflicts of interest in
confidence, and all said Defendants did keep the
Enterprise and their personal and financial
interrelationship confidential from opposing parties,
court administrators, opposing counsel, and most
clients by violating their fiduciary obligations and
duty to disclose.

PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

102. .Pattern. of .racketeering activity..79 More than
two distinct Predicate Acts80 have been pled, though
only two such acts need be pled.81 All such related
acts occurred after the effective date of the RICO
Act (i.e. after October 15, 1970).
103. The Predicate Acts are related in that they all
further the common goals of the Enterprise82; have
common participants,83 common methods of commission,84
common injuries,85 and numerous, common class of
victims.86
104. The Predicate Acts reflect continuity since they

79 Pattern. 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) " =pattern of racketeering
activity‘ requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity;"(emphasis added).

80 .Predicate Acts.. To constitute a .predicate act., there
merely needs to be properly pled violations of the

criminal statutes listed in §1961.

81 See Infra for Predicate Acts violating Hobbs Act, Travel
Act, Money Laundering, Monetary Transactions, and Mail and
Wire Fraud.

82 Supra, ¶‘s 97 - 101.

83 In each instance, participants were Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers,
Ferguson, Calhoun, and the Coconspirators, Aiders, and
Abettors.

84 Supra, ¶‘s 14 - 93.

85 See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

86 Litigants in domestic relations proceedings before
Ferguson or Calhoun represented by and/or opposed by
Defendant Attorneys– see Class Definition. Infra, ¶‘s 113-
124.

began in 1993,87 have continued uninterrupted since
that date, continuing by Calhoun in a modified
mediation/arbitration format and by money laundering
to divert income to Calhoun (nonimmune predicate acts
by Calhoun) after December 31, 2006, when Calhoun was
removed from office, and will continue into the
future if not deterred by this civil action.

87 See ¶ 14, et seq, i.e. (§1962 (b)) Through control,
conversion of the preexisting legitimate hunting club into
a racketeering enterprise; Hobbs Act; Travel Act, Money
Laundering, Monetary Transactions, and Mail and wire fraud.

88 Supra, ¶ 59Error! Reference source not found.

89 Supra, ¶ 67.

90 Supra, ¶ 72.

91 Supra, ¶ 74.

92 See infra, ¶ 113.

93 Began in 1993, Toler in 1994-1996, 2004 and Mr. Clements,
2006-present.

105. The latest of the racketeering acts was within ten
years of a prior act.

106. The predicate acts are distinct in that the
Enterprise is a wholly distinct and separate entity
from its individual members and Predicate Acts are
based on violations of multiple §1961 prohibited
activities, e.g. Hobbs Act,88 Travel Act,89 money
laundering and monetary transactions violations,90
and mail/wire fraud;91 predicate acts have been
targeted at and injured many different persons;92
over many years (1993-present).93

 
VIOLATIONS OF

18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d):

THROUGH A PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY  

107. The Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys and
Nominating Committee lawyers along with Calhoun
violated and in the future will continue to violate
18 U.S.C. 1962(a) by receiving income94 derived,
directly or indirectly, from a .pattern. of
.racketeering activity.95, and or collection of
usurious96 interest on unlawful debt for attorneys‘
fees in which such Defendants have participated as
principals and by .using and investing,. directly or
indirectly, part of such income, and the proceeds of
such income, in .acquisition of interests in and the
establishment and operation of. the Enterprise97
which is engaged in and the activities of which
affect interstate commerce;
a. Said Defendants did use and invest illegal income
from the Enterprise -

94 (See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53..

95 See discussion supra.

96 Interest on the enforceable debt, not the unenforceable,
artificially inflated debt, is for the .use or forbearance.
of money. To first inflate a debt by amounts of
unenforceable, champertous legal fees evades Alabama‘s
usury laws. See AL Code, 1975, §8-8-12, Willis v. Buchman,
30 Ala.App. 33, 199 So. 886 (Ala.App. 1940).

97 See, e.g. ¶‘s 113.

i. as campaign contributions98 in order to
establish and maintain the lucrative
judgeships of Calhoun and Ferguson which were
essential to accomplishment of their
racketeering activities (.Predicate Acts.);
ii. as improvements to Club amenities99 and
establish operating procedures which were
utilized by Defendants in order to share
unreported income from the Predicate Acts.

98 See ¶‘s 27-28.

99 Supra, ¶ 14-29.

100 In In re Shalen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation,
773 F. Supp 342 (S.D.FL, 1991) reinvestment to enable the
enterprise to continue its harm was found sufficient nexus
between income and a Plaintiff‘s harm.

iii. Reinvestments were made to allow the
Enterprise to continue its injurious
activities each year.100

iv. to establish physical facilities and provide
maintenance and operating costs to make the
Club‘s physical facilities available as a
remote and isolated place to hold meetings
for direct conduct of the Enterprise‘s
predicate acts – the facilities were remote;
gave Defendant‘s a cover for their
racketeering activities away from the eyes of
the public; but also provided them with
social interaction, binding them tightly

together personally, the benefits of which
accrued to the smooth operations of the
Enterprise over time – As Defendant Gorham
told a client in 2006, .Calhoun and I are in
the same hunting club together. We hunt
together all the time . . . [we] sit around
down there drinking a lot of whiskey together
. . . the judge and I are real G_ _ D_ _ _
tight!101.

101 Gorham made this statement to Gorham client Mr. Clements
in 2006, after Judge Calhoun stated on 6/16/2003 he had
.quit. being a member of the club many years ago-it appears
Calhoun didn‘t quit being a member, he just quit paying
dues.

102 These positions are presented in the .alternative.. The
rule in the Eleventh Circuit is not that injuries must have
been proximately caused by violations of §1962(a), (b),
(c), and (d). Such a special .RICO injury. was clearly and
specifically dismissed by the Supreme Court in Sedima v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3277-78, 87
L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Since Sedima, the Eleventh Circuit has
followed the Supreme Court‘s holding. (See e.g. Pelletier,
Private litigants can recover under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) but
their injury must .flow from the commission of the
predicate acts.. Sedima, at 497.

b. The foregoing .use and investment. of income
derived from the Predicate Acts violated §1962
(a) and as a proximate result102 of such violation
and the predicate acts, Plaintiff class members
were injured in their business and/or property by
reason of such violation of § 1962 (a) by:
i. enabling the Enterprise to have been
established,

 

ii. providing essential physical facilities,
including both the Club and the judges‘
courtrooms, for necessary conduct of the
Enterprise,

iii. establishing the initial basis for all future
Predicate Acts and maintaining the Enterprise
which proximately injured the Plaintiff class
in their property and business interests, and

c. .in acquisition of interests in and the
establishment and operation of the Enterprise..
Investments in the Club as described in ¶29,
supra, represented acquisition of interests in
and/or establishment of the Club and/or the
judges‘ courtrooms as the Enterprise. Campaign
contributions reflect both establishment and
operation of the Club as Enterprise as well as
investment in and establishment of the Alabama
courtrooms of these judges as the alternative
Enterprise.

108. The Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys, the
Nominating Committee lawyers along with Calhoun and
Ferguson to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) by, through a
.pattern of racketeering activity.103 or collection

103 See, ¶102 et seq.

of usurious interest on an unlawful debt for
attorneys‘ fees,104 .acquiring and maintaining,.105
directly or indirectly, an .interest in or control
of. the Enterprise106 which is engaged in, and the
activities of which affect interstate commerce;
a. [A]cquiring and maintaining, directly or
indirectly, an interest in107 the Enterprise.
i. Said Defendants have proprietary interests
and property rights, including the 2,700 acre
leasehold, in the Enterprise as the result of
their use and investment of income from the
Predicate Acts to acquire and maintain such
interests.
ii. Said Defendants share the right to enjoyment
of Enterprise property and its illegal

104 Interest on the enforceable debt, not the unenforceable,
artificially inflated debt, is for the Ause or forbearance@
of money. To first inflate a debt by unenforceable amounts
evades Alabama=s usury laws. See AL Code, 1975, '8-8-12,
Willis v. Buchman, 30 Ala.App. 33, 199 So. 886 (Ala.App.
1940).

105 Unlike §1962(a), there is no requirement that the
maintenance or acquisition of an interest come from the use
or investment of illegal income from the Enterprise.

106 see, e.g. ¶‘s 14-29.

107 .Interest in. requires more than a general interest in
the results of the Enterprise‘s actions. .[I]nterest. in
fact encompasses all property rights in an enterprise for
purposes of § 1962(b). See United States v. Martino, 681
F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir.1982)(en banc) participation in the
advantage, profit and responsibility of the enterprise is
an .interest.. See Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden Inc.,
763 F.Supp. 143, 147 (W.D.Pa.1990).

income, and such income rights held by said
Defendants constitute an interest in the
Enterprise.108

108 See e.g., ¶‘s 97 - 101 supra.

109 .Control. includes some ownership of the Enterprise
(Enterprise is, alternatively, (1) association of
individuals; (2) hunting club; and/or (3) judges‘ courts)
or an ability to exercise dominion over it, but need not be
formal control and .need not be the kind of control that is
obtained, for example, by acquiring a majority of the stock
of a corporation. .) (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co.,
727 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir.1984)).

b. or, control109 of the Enterprise –

i. See ¶‘s 14, 29, and 95. The Club membership
consisted of 16 or 17 members, all of whom
are Defendants in this case; ten of such
members are domestic relations or criminal
lawyers who alone paid all costs of the
hunting club‘s operations (four Known
Defendant Attorneys, six Unknown Criminal
Defendant Attorneys), two judges (Calhoun and
a Circuit judge, criminal division) who, of
course, controlled their courtrooms, and four
or five Unknown Coconspirators and Aiders and
Abettors who shared in Club benefits as an
interest in the Enterprise and who joined
with other Defendants in controlling the
Enterprise.

c. Said Defendants‘ having an interest in and/or

control over the Enterprise in its various
alternative forms enabled Defendants Ferguson,
Calhoun, Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys,
and Nominating Committee Lawyers to effectively
accomplish their joint goals.110 Said Defendants‘
interest in and control of the Enterprise allowed
the Enterprise to operate without discovery
through the cover of the Club and the judges‘
courtrooms, was essential in effective operation
of the Enterprise, and was a necessary tool for
accomplishment of its predicate acts and the
proximate injury to the property and business of
Plaintiff class members.

110 Supra, Enterprise Common Goals.

d. Acquiring and maintaining control over and a
proprietary interest in the income and property
of the Enterprise, including particularly the
judges‘ courtrooms, in violation of §1962(b),
proximately resulted in direct injury to property
and business interests of parties in domestic
relations proceedings before Calhoun.

109. The Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys,
Nominating Committee lawyers, Ferguson and Calhoun
violated and continue to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)
by, .being employed by and/or associated with. the

Enterprise111 which is engaged in, and the activities
of which affect, interstate commerce, said Defendants
did .conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of. such Enterprise‘s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity112 or collection of
usurious interest on unlawful debt for attorneys‘
fees;113
a. Said Defendants were employed by and/or
associated with the Enterprise. – Employed by
and/or associated with are less stringent
requirements than .control.. Since said
Defendants did form, conspire with, own an
.interest in. and .control. the Enterprise,
receive and divide the profits of the Enterprise,
they are clearly .associated with. the
.Enterprise. as a separate and distinct entity in
all of its alternative forms. Said Defendants‘
being associated with the Enterprise allowed them
to accomplish Predicate Acts through the
Enterprise and proximately caused injury to the
property and business of Plaintiff class members.
b. Said [D]efendants did conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

111 See, e.g. ¶‘s 14-29.

112 See, e.g. ¶ 102.

113 Supra, Note 88.

Enterprise’s affairs.114
i. .[C]onduct of an enterprise.. The Enterprise
must engage in a .course of conduct,. i.e.
have a common purpose for accomplishment of
common goals.115
ii. .Conduct.. Defendants .must participate in
the operation or management of the enterprise
itself..116 Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys, Nominating
Committee Lawyers, and Unknown Coconspirators
and Aiders and Abettors directly participated
in conspiring to and accomplishing the
Enterprise‘s common goals of collecting
illegal income through fraud, knowing failure
and refusal to provide honest services, money
laundering, monetary transactions, Travel
Act, Hobbs Act, and mail/wire fraud
violations thereby violating §1962(c), and
iii. The Enterprise must be and is separate and
distinct from its individual members.117

114 See ¶‘s 14 - 18, 29-58.

115 Supra ¶‘s 97 - 101 for common goals of the Enterprise.
See Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277,
1283-1284, (C.A. 11, 2006)).

116 Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct.
1163, 1173, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993).

117 See supra, ¶ 95.

c. As the proximate result of such violations,
Plaintiff class members were proximately injured
in their property and business. See supra, ¶‘s
34-36, 42, and 53-54.

110. Known and Unknown Defendant Attorneys and
Nominating Committee Lawyers in conspiracy with
Calhoun and Ferguson and the Unknown Coconspirators
and Aiders and Abettors violated and continue to
violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) by conspiring through
regular meetings and communications at the Club and
in the Courts conspired to violate the provisions of
18 U.S.C. 1962, subsections (a), (b), and/or (c)
through regular meetings and communications at the
Club and in the Courts.
a. Such conspiratorial planning occurred through ex
parte discussions through the association of
individuals as well as at the Club and the
controlled courtrooms and judges‘ chambers of the
Enterprise.
i. These conspiracies included initially
conspiring to attempt to reach the five
common goals of the Enterprise,118 and
ii. thereafter conspiring to accomplish all such
joint goals in individual cases before

118 Infra, ¶‘s 97 - 101.

Defendants Calhoun and Ferguson as Predicate
Acts, e.g. see supra discussion of ex parte
conspiratorial communications.119
iii. As the proximate result of such
conspiratorial planning, Defendants did also
directly violate §1962 (a), (b), and (c)
proximately resulting in direct injury to
property and business interests of the
Plaintiff class members as reflected supra.
iv. All coconspirators did intend to and did take
numerous actions in furtherance of their
conspiracy.

119 See Castro, (11th Cir.), supra, Note 76 -conspiracy to
commit an overall objective or to commit at least two
Predicate Acts is sufficient to violate §1962(d).

STANDING AND PROXIMATE CAUSE

111. Plaintiff class has standing to sue all Known and
Unknown Defendant Attorneys, the Nominating Committee
Lawyers, Calhoun, Ferguson, and the Unknown
Coconspirators and Aiders and Abettors for treble
damages under §1964(c) for injuries to their business
and/or property .by reason of. said Defendants‘
violations of § 1962. Such proximate injuries were
suffered by reason of Defendants‘ racketeering
activities, i.e. the Predicate Acts.

112. To have standing, Plaintiff must be a person (1)
injured in his business or property, (2) by reason of
(3) a violation of §1962, i.e. by a Predicate Act.

Injured in his business or property . . . a
violation of §1962.(See supra, ¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-
53.)

a. .By reason of” –
i. .And the Supreme Court has already told us
that =by reason of‘ incorporates a proximate
cause standard, see Holmes v. Sec. Investor
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-68, 112 S.Ct.
1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992)”.120
ii. A wrongful act is .a proximate cause if it is
a substantial factor in the sequence of
responsible causation.. Cox v. Administrator
U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1399
(11th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Need not be
sole nor even primary cause – Defendants not
absolved merely because there are other
contributing factors at work.

120 See Cox, infra, subparagraph ii.

PLAINTIFF CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

113. This action has been brought and may be properly
maintained as a class action pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure because:
114. The questions and issues of law and fact raised in
this action are of a common or general interest,
affecting many persons, including existence of the
Enterprise, Defendants Calhoun and Ferguson‘s
disqualification, charging clients and opposing
parties for valid divorce decrees but providing them
with divorce decrees of questionable validity,
fraudulent nature of attorney‘s fees awarded Known
and Unknown Defendant Attorneys and Nomination
Committee Lawyers, violations of Hobbs Act, Travel
Act, money laundering, monetary transactions
violations, mail and wire fraud, and fraudulent
suppression.
115. The plaintiff class, as hereinafter described and
defined, may consist of as many as 2,000 or more
members, and is so numerous that it is impractical to
bring all members of the class before the court;
116. The questions of law or fact common to the class
are substantially similar and predominate over the
single question of certain types121 of individual

121 Primary damages constitute legal fees wrongly extorted
for .honest services. and valid orders and judgments which
plaintiffs did not receive. Injury can be easily calculated
by merely adding total legal fees. Injuries as a result of
fraudulent property settlements, alimony, etc. are the only
type of injury requiring individual proof and does not
prevent class action certification in the Eleventh Circuit.

See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir.,
2004). (Emphasis added). (.[N]umerous courts have
recognized that the presence of individualized damage
issues does not prevent a finding that the common issues in
the case predominate.. (Citations omitted))

damages;
a. Existence and control of the .Enterprise. and
its impact on interstate commerce.
b. The .Pattern. of predicate acts necessary to
establish liability under RICO.
c. Proof of Defendants‘ .predicate acts.
is the same for all class members.
d. Edwards-type mail fraud, i.e. .Scheme to
defraud. - Deceit, .pay for one thing but
receive another..
e. Hobbs Act violations.
f. .Honest services. mail fraud.
g. Issues of Money Laundering, Monetary
Transactions and Travel Act violations are
common issues for all Plaintiff class members.
h. .Duty. to disclose and scheme to defraud are
the same for all class members.
i. Reliance.
j. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c)
and d.
k. Standing-Injury to .property or business..
l. Rule 23(b)(3) Factors.

117. There is a community of interest in obtaining
appropriate legal and equitable relief for the common
law and statutory violations, unfair business
practices, negligence, fraud, and other
improprieties, and in obtaining adequate compensation
for the damages and injuries which defendants'
actions have inflicted on the class. Indeed, there is
a community of interest as to whether the combined
assets and available insurance of defendants is
sufficient to adequately compensate the members of
the class for the injuries sustained;
118. The Representative Plaintiffs are members of the
class hereinafter described and defined, their claims
are typical of the claims of the class, and each
Representative Plaintiffs‘ damages greatly exceed
$75,000;122
119. Representative Plaintiffs will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class and
have no interests that conflict with the class.
120. Without class certification, the prosecution of
separate actions by individual members of the
plaintiff class would create a risk of:
a. Inconsistent or varying adjudications with

122 See¶‘s 34, 35-36, 42, 52-53.

respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for defendants; or
b. Adjudications with respect to the individual
members which would, as a practical matter, be
dispositive of the interests of other members
not parties to the adjudication, or would
substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests, including, but not
limited to, the potential for exhausting the
funds available from those parties who are or
may be responsible defendants;

121. Defendants Ferguson, Calhoun, Known and Unknown
Defendant Attorneys, Nominating Committee Lawyers,
and Coconspirator Aiders and Abettors have acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class regarding fraud, suppression, refusal of said
Defendants to disclose facts of their conflicts of
interest thereby making final injunctive relief
appropriate with respect to the class as a whole; and
122. A class action brought by Representative
Plaintiffs is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims
presented by this Complaint, and will prevent the
undue financial, administrative, and procedural
burdens on the parties and on the court which

duplicative individual litigation would impose.
123. The plaintiff class consists of and is defined as:

Persons who, directly or indirectly, were
(a) persons connected to or parties to or
associated with any domestic and/or
divorce matters, interests, issues,
proceedings and/or actions, whether or not
filed or litigated, and were represented
by or opposed by, directly or indirectly,
any such Defendant Attorneys (Wright,
Gorham, Fernambucq, and Vincent and their
respective law firms, Najjar, Denaburg, et
al, P.C., Gorham and Cason, LLC, and Boyd,
Fernambucq and Vincent, P.C. and their
unknown partners and associates along with
the unknown Nomination Committee Lawyers,
Unknown Defendant Attorneys, and their
respective unknown law firms, partners and
associates) and who otherwise appeared
before or otherwise dealt, directly or
indirectly, with Fernambucq or Calhoun,
including the children of such persons
whose custody and welfare were, directly
or indirectly, an issue in such family
and/or divorce matters, interests, issues,
proceedings and/or actions.

124. At all material times, the Representative
Plaintiffs are within the class of persons described
in Paragraph 122 above having been a party to actions
appearing before Ferguson or Calhoun and opposed by
and/or represented by said defendant attorneys.

Wherefore Representative Plaintiffs and Plaintiff
class members were injured in person, business
interests, and property by the foregoing actions and
demand the following relief:

a. Judgment against Defendants to the full extent of
such damages, being not less than $30,000,000 in
consequential damages plus punitive damages
[Alabama fraud injuries] and costs including
reasonable attorneys‘ fees, plus other damages to
which the Plaintiff may be entitled, including
treble damages under 18 U.S.C. §1964.
b. Class members and each of them is entitled to be
reimbursed their costs and attorneys‘ fees
associated with this action.
c. Class members are entitled to equitable relief in
the form necessary to prevent future denial of
justice and the appearance of justice to the
residents of Jefferson County, Alabama, in
domestic relations matters as provided in 18
U.S.C. §1964 and under applicable Alabama law.

Respectfully submitted,

 /s/

Joseph W. Blackburn,

Attorney for Representative Plaintiffs and
Plaintiff Class

4037 Butler Springs Place

Birmingham, Al 35226

Tel. 205-835-5847

DEMAND FOR JURY TRAIL

 Please take notice that Representative Plaintiffs
and Plaintiff class demand trial by struck jury of all
of the issues in this case.

 
________/s/___________________

 Counsel to the Plaintiff class:

 Joseph W. Blackburn

4037 Butler Springs Place

Birmingham, Al 35226

Tel. 205-835-5847

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  

I, Joseph W. Blackburn, hereby certify that on
_________, I filed this COMPLAINT, with the Clerk for
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama in compliance with its procedures for physical
and electronic filing with the following persons.

Recipients:

Mr. John C. Calhoun

c/o Bettie J. Carmack

Office of the Attorney General

Alabama State House

11 South Union St.

Montgomery, AL 36160-0152

Judge R.A.Ferguson

c/o Bettie J. Carmack

Office of the Attorney General

Alabama State House

11 South Union St.

Montgomery, AL 36160-0152

Mr. George Richard Fernambucq

Boyd, Fernambucq & Vincent, P.C.

2801 University Blvd., Ste. 302

Birmingham , AL 35233-0000

(205) 930-9000

Mr. Richard Vincent

Boyd, Fernambucq & Vincent, P.C.

2801 University Blvd., Ste. 302

Birmingham , AL 35233-0000

(205) 930-9000

Boyd, Fernambucq, Vincent & Dunn, P.C.

J. Ronald Boyd, Agent

And its partners, members and shareholders

2801 University Blvd., Ste. 302

Birmingham , AL 35233-0000

(205) 930-9000

Mr. Charles William Gorham

Gorham & Cason, L.L.C.

505 20th St N Ste 1650
Birmingham, AL 35203-4630

(205) 251-9166

205) 581-5038

Gorham & Cason, L.L.C.

Charles Gorham, Agent

And its partners, members and shareholders

505 20th St N Ste 1650
Birmingham, AL 35203-4630

205) 581-5038

(205) 251-9166

L. Steven Wright

Najjar, Denaburg, P.C.

2125 Morris Ave
Birmingham, AL 35203-4209

(205) 250-8400

Najjar, Denaburg, P.C.

Robert H. Adams, Agent

And its partners, members and shareholders

2125 Morris Ave
Birmingham, AL 35203-4209

(205) 250-8400

and another................

ANGELA TURNER DREES (Plaintiff)

vs.

R.A. FERGUSON, JR. (Defendant)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA